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Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: The
Supreme Court Opens the Door for
Heightened Limits on Attorney Advertising
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.1 involves the constitutionality of
Florida Bar rules prohibiting personal injury lawyers from sending
targeted direct-mail solicitations to accident victims and their families
within thirty days following an accident. In March 1992, respondent
Went For It, Inc., a lawyer referral service, and its owner, G. Stewart
McHenry, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida against the Florida Bar, seeking declatory and
injunctive relief.3 After referral from the district court, a magistrate
judge recommended summary judgment in favor of the Florida Bar.4
The magistrate judge found that the Florida Bar had substantial
interests, based on professionalism concerns, in protecting both the
privacy and tranquility of accident victims and their families from undue
influence in times of weakness.5 Relying on a Florida Bar two-year
survey (conducted prior to enactment of the rules) which concluded
lawyer advertising adversely effects public opinion, the judge held that
the rules directly served these interests and were no broader than
Upon de novo review, the district court rejected this
necessary.'
recommendation and instead granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that the ban violated constitutional guarantees of free
speech by significantly reducing to those in need the availability of
truthful, relevant information regarding legal services.7 Bound by
precedent, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reluctantly affirmed

1.

115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).

2. Id. at 2374.
3. Id. In October 1992, McHenry was disbarred for other reasons in Florida Bar v.
McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1992). John T. Blakely, another Florida lawyer, was
substituted into the suit in his place. Id.
4. 115 S. Ct. at 2374.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 21 F.3d 1038, 1041 (1994).
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the decision!8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.'
The Court held that the Florida Bar's substantial interest in protecting
injured residents and their families from invasive lawyer conduct was
supported by statistical and anecdotal evidence, and was addressed by
a regulation sufficiently narrow in scope and duration to meet First
Amendment requirements.'0
First Amendment protection of commercial speech is of recent vintage
in this country. The first recognition of limited protection came in the
mid-seventies in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council,Inc." In that case, the Court held that pharmacists
truthfully advertising prescription drug prices were entitled to limited
First Amendment protection because commercial information aids
consumers in making informed decisions. 2 A year later, the Court
expanded this protection in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona" to include
protection for price advertising by attorneys of certain routine legal
services.14 In doing so, the Court rejected several justifications offered
by the State for a complete ban on attorney advertising, including
traditional condemnation of attorney solicitation and the adverse effect
of such advertising on professionalism. 5 The Court concluded, "the
assertion that advertising will diminish the attorney's reputation in the
community is open to question."' However, the Court was quick to
point out that commercial speech protection is limited and that false or
potentially deceptive speech is subject to regulation. 7 In addition, the
overall protection afforded even truthful, nondeceptive commercial
speech is less than that of other forms of constitutionally protected
expression.'8 Consequently, there are times when restrictions on
truthful commercial speech are justified." One such instance was in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n. ° An attorney personally solicited two
car accident victims in an attempt to secure contingency fee contracts

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
simple

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1045.
115 S. Ct. at 2375, 2381.
Id.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 769, 773.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Id. These "routine services" included uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions,
personal bankruptcies, and changes of name. Id.

Id. at 367, 371.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 383-84.
436 U.S. 477 (1978).
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which would allow him to represent them in future lawsuits. 2 The bar
association brought disciplinary proceedings against the attorney for
violation of rules preventing him from accepting employment resulting
from unsolicited advice.22 Relying on Bates, the attorney challenged
the constitutionality of the rules.23 Distinguishing Bates, the Court
upheld the regulations, finding that the entitlement of in-person
solicitation of clients to First Amendment protection was less in degree
than the State's interest in prohibition of such conduct.24 Subsequently, a framework for analyzing this limited protection was established in
CentralHudson Gas Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.25
The Court in that case promulgated a three-step middle scrutiny test.
First, the governmental interest involved must be substantial. Second,
the restriction must directly advance the asserted interest. Third, the
regulation must be narrowly tailored and no more extensive than
necessary.26 This test was first applied to direct-mail solicitation by
attorneys in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n.2' The Court distinguished
direct-mail advertisements from in-person solicitation, which a state
Consequently the Court struck down a
could categorically ban.2'
Kentucky Bar ruling that categorically prohibited an attorney's truthful,
nondeceptive direct-mail solicitations to "potential clients who had a
foreclosure suit filed against them."' Initially, the Court recognized
that personal letters could present an increased risk of deception and
suggested possible less restrictive means of regulation.3" However, the
Court found that the substantial interests in banning in-person
solicitation-the strong possibility of lawyer misconduct and the
unlikeliness of effective alternative regulations--were not present with
direct-mail solicitation. 1 The Court reasoned that protection of
individual privacy was not a substantial state interest under these
circumstances because direct-mail letters "can readily be put in a drawer
to be considered later, ignored, or discarded."3 2 Recently, in Edenfield

21. Id. at 450-51.
22. Id. at 453 n.9.

23. Id. at 455.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 569-72.
486 U.S. 466 (1988).
Id. at 472.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 475-76.
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v. Fane,33 the Supreme Court applied the same CentralHudson test to
advertising by accountants and found that protection of individual
privacy was a substantial state interest.3 4 In Edenfield, the Florida
Board of Accountancy prohibited certified public accountants ("CPAs")
from engaging in in-person solicitation." The Court recognized that
even truthful solicitations could "be pressed with such frequency or
vehemence as to intimidate, vex, or harass the recipient."3 However,
the Court rejected the State's contention that Ohralik was controlling,
finding that Ohralik did not stand for the proposition that blanket bans
on personal solicitation by all professionals are always constitutional.3 7
Instead, the Court held that the dangers presented with in-person
solicitation by an attorney, trained in the art of advocacy and persuasion, did not exist with CPAs, who are trained in objectivity and
independence.3 " Accordingly, the Court found that the blanket ban was
more extensive than necessary and had no direct relation to the asserted
interest.3 9
The decision in FloridaBar marked a shift in philosophy by the Court,
moving to recognition of a threshhold amount of state autonomy in the
regulation of attorney conduct.4 Armed with several factors distinguishing this case from the decision in Shapero, the Court found that the
thirty-day ban did meet Central Hudson's three-tiered analysis test.41
The Court first looked at the Florida Bar's proffered interest "in
protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and
their loved ones,"42 which in turn effects the larger concerns of limiting
activities that injure the administration of justice.43 Finding this
interest substantial, the Court pointed to Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar," which held that "States have a compelling interest in the
practice of professions within their boundaries, and ...they have broad

33. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
34. Id. at 1799.
35. Id. at 1796.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1802.
38. Id. at 1802-03.
39. Id. at 1802-04.
40. 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376. This position was most often espoused by Justice O'Connor,
who wrote the majority opinion in this case. Id. at 2374. She had previously expressed
these concerns in Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1804, where she was the lone dissenting Justice,
and in Shapero, arguing that the cases forming precedent in this area were "built on
defective premises and flawed reasoning." 486 U.S. at 480.
41. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381.
42. Id. at 2376.
43. Id.
44. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating
the practice of professions."4 The Court also noted previous occasions
in other contexts where they had recognized the importance of protecting
the tranquility and privacy of the home.48 With the first prong
satisfied, the Court then looked to whether the regulation advanced this
interest in a direct and material way.47 The Court was careful to
recognize that a restriction can only be sustained when it can be shown
that the material harms will be directly alleviated by the restriction."
To clarify this standard, the Court pointed to Edenfield, where the ban
on in-person solicitations by CPAs was struck down because the State
Board of Accountancy presented no studies or other evidence establishing a link between such conduct and the interests and concerns claimed
by the board.49 The Court found no such lack of evidence in this case,
pointing to the summary of the two-year study containing both
statistical and anecdotal evidence supporting the Florida Bar's contenThe study included various general population surveys,
tions.5'
newspaper editorials, and excerpts from complaint letters received from
direct-mail solicitation recipients.5' This evidence revealed that those
receiving direct-mail solicitations, as well as the public at large, had
lower regard for the legal profession and the judicial process as a
whole.52 In light of this evidence, the Court concluded that the second
prong of the Central Hudson test had been satisfied.53 The Court also
carefully pointed out several other factors distinguishing this case from
Shapero, including the State's failure in Shapero to justify the regulation
on grounds of protection of privacy interests." In addition, Shapero
dealt with a complete ban on all direct-mail solicitations, as opposed to
the temporary thirty-day restriction in this case. 55 Finally, the State
in Shapero presented no evidence showing actual harm caused by the
targeted direct-mail solicitations." The Court also took exception to
the Shapero majority's trivialization of the potential harm as one that
could be avoided by simply putting the unsolicited direct-mail letter

45.
46.
47.
48.

FloridaBar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792).
Id. at 2377.
Id.
Id.

49. Id.
50.
51.

Id. at 2377-78.
Id.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 2378.
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
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away."7 The Court reasoned that the harm sought to be avoided is just
as much "simple receipt of targeted solicitations within days of accidents
as it is a function of the letters' contents."" Accordingly, harm caused
by the former concern could not be avoided by simply putting the letter
in a drawer for later consideration.5 9 Arriving at prong three, the
Court prefaced this analysis with a clarification of the applicable
standard, characterizing the fit necessary between the ends and means
as a reasonably narrow one.' In finding the requisite fit in this case,
the majority debunked two major contentions of the dissent. 1 First,
the Court looked to claims that the regulation was constitutionally overinclusive, banning mailings even to persons with relatively minor
injuries and grief.62 The Court held that the rule is reasonably well
related to its objective because no less burdensome options existed and
because lines could not be properly drawn between more and less severe
and grievous injuries." Second, the Court considered whether the rule
prevented citizens from learning about their legal options at a most
crucial time." The Court summarily rejected this idea, concluding that
there were available many other ways for injured persons to learn about
the availability of legal council during the thirty-day ban.65 Finding all
three prongs of the CentralHudson test satisfied, the Court upheld the
regulation."
Despite factual differences between this case and Shapero, the result
of this decision is a clear departure-following along the same line of
reasoning seen in Edenfield-from what had been an increasing trend
by the Court toward more restrictions on the states' authority to regulate
advertising by lawyers. The Court was less persuaded than it was in
Bates, which found the "postulated connection between advertising and
the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained."67 Perhaps
the Court has come to accept the notion that, in the years since the
Bates decision, "the development of attorney advertising.., has not been
as favorable as the Bates Court anticipated.' s It is hard to imagine

57.

Id. at 2379.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 2380.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.

64. Id.
65. Id, at 2381.

66. Id.
67. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
68. Petitioner's Brief (1994 WL 614916, at 14), FloridaBar v. Went ForIt, Inc., 115 S.
Ct. at 2371.
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that the Court in Bates could have foreseen what has turned out to be
a full scale onslaught of attorney advertising through billboards,
television and radio spots, newspaper ads, and even untargeted letters
to the general population. Indeed, in developing concrete guidelines,
"the Court has been unable or unwilling to restrain the logic of the
underlying analysis within reasonable bounds. 9 In the interim,
confidence in the legal profession and judicial system has been eroded
by repeated invasive conduct by attorneys. 0 As the dissent argues, it
appears now that the Court is perhaps retreating from less expansive
guarantees of commercial free speech in order to protect the legal
profession from public criticism." Yet other states may be quick to
follow Florida's lead, as Texas did in Moore v. Morales72 just months
after the Court's decision in FloridaBar.73 At least for the moment, it
appears that the Court is more willing to embrace Justice O'Connor's
long held contention that states should be given more leeway in
regulating attorney advertising, recognizing that there are important
distinctions between advertisements for commercial products and
advertisements for professional services.7 4
BRETT A. STEELE

69. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 480.
70. FloridaBar, 115 S. Ct. at 2381.

71. Id. at 2386.
72. 63 F.3d 358 (1995).
73. In that decision, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the
decision in FloridaBar,upheld a Texas thirty-day ban on attorneys' direct-mail solicitation

of accident victims or their families. Id.
74. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 481.

